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Linda Leuchter Addison *
URING this survey period, the appellate courts of Texas deliv-
ered numerous decisions construing various rules of evidence.
The holdings of greatest significance lie in the following substan-
tive areas: (1) the hearsay rule and its exceptions; (2) expert opinion evi-
dence; (3) parol evidence; (4) judicial notice; (5) impeachment;
(6) privileges; (7) admissibility; (8) lack of probative evidence and insuffi-
cient evidence; and (9) presumptions and inferences.
The most significant development in the field of evidence during this
survey period was the promulgation of the Texas Rules of Evidence by the
Texas Supreme Court.' The Texas Rules of Evidence became effective in
all civil cases on September 1, 1983. The Texas Rules of Evidence both
codify and change prior Texas case and statutory law, and additionally
adopt and tailor provisions of the Federal Rules of Evidence for Texas
practice. Thus, while their numbering system basically follows that of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, the Texas Rules of Evidence are a hybrid of
both Texas and federal practice. No Texas appellate court during this sur-
vey period, or even as of the date of this writing, has yet applied or inter-
preted any of the new rules of evidence. Accordingly, this survey neither
attempts nor purports to be an exhaustive analysis of the Texas Rules of
Evidence.2
I. THE HEARSAY RULE AND ITS EXCEPTIONS
A. Identfying Hearsay
Whether a particular record or statement offered to prove its truth con-
* J.D., University of Texas. Attorney at Law, Fulbright & Jaworski, Houston, Texas.
1. Order Adopting the Texas Rules of Evidence (Tex. Sup. Ct. Nov. 23, 1982). The
Texas Rules of Evidence were promulgated by the Texas Supreme Court pursuant to its
general rulemaking power, TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1731a (Vernon 1962), so that
they can be updated or modified as necessary rather than requiring legislative amendment
every two years. Under this statute the supreme court is also authorized to repeal conflicting
statutes, subject to possible reenactment by the legislature, by filing a letter with the secre-
tary of state and sending a copy to all members of the legislature. Id §§ 1-3; Caperton &
McGee, Background, Scope and Applicability of the Texas Rules of Evidence, 20 Hous. L.
REV. 49, 56 (1983) (Tex. R. Evid. Handbook). The court's order included a list of 37 re-
pealed statutes. Order Adopting the Texas Rules of Evidence (Tex. Sup. Ct. Nov. 23, 1982);
see Caperton & McGee, supra, at 84-85 (list of repealed statutes).
2. For a general overview and introduction to the Texas Rules of Evidence, see Addi-
son, A Practical Guide to the Texas Rules ofEvidence, 46 TEX. B.J. 1024 (1983).
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JO URNAL
stitutes hearsay is often difficult to determine. Hearsay is "a statement,
other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hear-
ing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted."' 3 Each
year numerous appellate courts hold that certain out-of-court statements
are inadmissible hearsay. These holdings occur with frequency for reasons
explored by the Houston court of appeals in Estate of Diggs v. Enterprise
Life Insurance Co. 4 In Estate of Diggs the court reversed a summary judg-
ment based on an affidavit. 5 The court accepted the appellant's contention
that although the affiant stated that he had personal knowledge of the facts
testified to in the affidavit, nothing in the affidavit demonstrated actual
personal knowledge of the matters he averred. To be sufficient an affidavit
must in some way show that the affiant is personally familiar with the facts
so that he would be qualified to testify as a witness.6 In ruling that a reci-
tation by an affiant that he has personal knowledge is not in itself sufficient
to show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify as required by
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166-A(c), 7 the court of appeals explained
that a fact considered by a layman to be personally known to him may in
fact be hearsay in law.8
Evidence that would be hearsay if offered to prove the truth of the mat-
ters stated therein may be admitted for other limited purposes. 9 During
the survey period, the Texas Supreme Court held certain hearsay evidence
admissible for a limited purpose in Turner, Collie & Braden v. Brookhollow,
Inc. 10 Brookhollow arose out of the allegedly defective construction of a
sewer system. Brookhollow, a developer, sought to introduce a report that
evaluated several alternatives for extending sewer service into a certain
subdivision. The court of appeals held the report inadmissible." In re-
versing the judgment of the court of appeals, the supreme court held that
3. TEX. R. EvID. 801(d). The hearsay rule and its exceptions are comprehensively
defined in id. 801-806. Additionally, id 602 provides that "[a] witness may not testify to a
matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that he has personal
knowledge of the matter."
4. 646 S.W.2d 573 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, no writ).
5. Id at 575-76.
6. Weaver v. Brandin, 394 S.W.2d 709, 711-12 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1965, writ
dism'd).
7. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 166-A(c).
8. 646 S.W.2d at 575. Another example of hearsay held inadmissible during this sur-
vey period occurred in Thermo Products Co. v. Chilton Indep. School Dist., 647 S.W.2d 726,
731 (Tex. App.-Waco 1983, writ refd n.r.e.) (testimony of witness that defendant's alleged
agent had told witness what agent reported to agent's alleged principal).
9. TEX. R. EvID. 105 codifies the rule of limited admissibility. The rule provides that
when evidence admissible as to one party or for one purpose is not admissible as to another
party or for another purpose, the court, upon request, shall restrict the evidence to its proper
scope and so instruct the jury. Rule 105 also limits the grounds for appeal when a limiting
instruction as provided in rule 105(a) is not requested. Rule 105 should be read in conjunc-
tion with id 403, which permits exclusion of relevant evidence on special grounds such as
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or undue delay. Rule 105(b) provides that when
evidence that would be admissible for a limited purpose is excluded, the exclusion will not
be grounds for appeal unless the evidence was offered expressly for its limited admissible
purpose. Id. 105(b).
10. 642 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. 1982).
II. 624 S.W.2d 203 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1981).
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the report was admissible for the limited purpose of showing that the de-
veloper acted reasonably in abandoning a sewer line and thus met its duty
to mitigate damages.' 2 The supreme court explained that the report, when
admitted for such a limited purpose, would not have been hearsay, because
it would have been admitted not to prove the truth of the matters stated
therein but as evidence of whether the developer acted prudently.' 3
Another example of when a limited offer takes a document out of the
parameters of hearsay appeared in Ashford Development, Inc. v. USLife
RealEstate Services Corp. 14 Ashford involved a suit by a borrower against
a lender and mortgage broker to recover a fee the borrowers had paid in
connection with a mortgage loan application. The Dallas court of appeals
affirmed the admission into evidence of certain documents that the lender
offered for a limited purpose. The court held that the documents were
offered solely with respect to the issue of the reasonableness of USLife's
conduct and not to prove the truth of the matters contained therein.' 5 By
reversing the case on other grounds, the supreme court rendered this evi-
dence question moot.16
B. Business Records
The previous statutory exception to the hearsay rule allowing the admis-
sion of business and other records 17 has been replaced by Texas Rule of
Evidence 803(6), which governs the introduction of records of regularly
conducted activities.' 8 The Texas Rules of Evidence do not, however, con-
tain a specific provision regarding the admission of summaries of records
of regularly conducted activities. Practitioners therefore should assume
that the method of introducing summaries of business records probably
will not change from prior Texas practice. The practice for admitting such
summaries was recently described in Hovas v. O'Brien. 19 In affirming the
trial court's admission into evidence of certain business record summaries,
the court of appeals found that the appellee had met her burden of proof
for the admission of summaries by proving that the records were volumi-
nous, that they were made available for inspection by the opponent or
were present in the courtroom, and that the business records themselves
were admissible into evidence. 20
12. 642 S.W.2d at 167.
13. Id
14. 649 S.W.2d 96 (Tex. App.-Dallas), rev'don other grounds, 661 S.W.2d 933 (Tex.
1983).
15. 649 S.W.2d at 100-101.
16. 661 S.W.2d 933, 934 (Tex. 1983).
17. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3737e (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983). Article 3737e was
repealed in 1983 in conjunction with the adoption of the Texas Rules of Evidence.
18. TEX. R. EvID. 805(6). The new practice to qualify business records remains sub-
stantially the same as the procedure under former TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 3737e.
19. 654 S.W.2d 801 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
20. Id at 803.
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C Then Existing Mental, Emotional, or Physical Condition
A well-recognized exception to the hearsay rule allows the admission
into evidence of statements tending to show either the state of mind or the
physical condition of the declarant. 2 The long line of cases carving out
this common law exception to the hearsay rule is now codified in Texas
Rule of Evidence 803(3), which governs the admission of statements relat-
ing to then existing mental, emotional, or physical conditions.22 During
this survey period the Texas Supreme Court in Walters v. American States
Insurance Co. 23 construed this exception. Walters involved a claim for
workers' compensation death benefits. The issue was whether the dece-
dent died in the course of his employment. On the date of his death, em-
ployee Justice accompanied his employer, Lamport, to meet a potential
client at the Dallas Airport Marina Hotel. Both Justice and Lamport were
found shot to death later that day in a field near the Dallas-Fort Worth
Airport. At the time of trial, the assassin was still unknown. The trial
court admitted testimony of Lamport's employees that an unknown cus-
tomer first called Lamport's office on the Thursday prior to the Saturday
murders and said that he wanted to see Lamport about a restaurant pro-
ject. On Friday Lamport's office again received a call from a customer
who wanted to talk to Lamport about an interior design job for a restau-
rant. On Friday night Lamport himself received such a call. The cus-
tomer called a total of three times to speak with Lamport, not Justice. The
evidence further established that Justice had accompanied Lamport on the
trip in question to meet a client to discuss the design of a restaurant. In
ruling that the testimony of Lamport's employees regarding the telephone
calls was admissible, the supreme court held that statements tending to
show the state of mind and immediate purpose of a declarant are excep-
tions to the hearsay rule.24 The supreme court explained that Lamport's
statement to his employees regarding the call he received was admissible to
show his then existing state of mind, namely, Lamport's belief that he and
Justice were going to the airport to meet a client.25
D. Dying Declarations and Excited Utterances
Texas Rule of Evidence 804(b) (2) excepts from the hearsay definition in
civil cases "[a] statement made by a declarant while believing that his
death was imminent, concerning the cause or circumstances of what he
believed to be his impending death."' 26 This civil dying declarations ex-
ception is more liberal than the hearsay exception in criminal cases, be-
cause the death of the declarant is not a prerequisite to admission. Under
21. See generally IA R. RAY, TEXAS PRACTICE, LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 831-877 (3d ed.
1980) (basis and details of exception).
22. TEX. R. EvID. 803(3).
23. 654 S.W.2d 423 (Tex. 1983).
24. Id. at 427.
25. Id. at 427-28.
26. TEX. R. EviD. 804(b)(2).
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rule 804(b) (2) the declarant must only have believed his death was immi-
nent when he made the statement for the statement to be admissible.27
During this survey period the Tyler court of appeals found the dying
declarations exception inapplicable in a criminal case. In Trahan v.
State28 the court found that the statement of the soon to be deceased Mr.
Justice, identifying his assailant as the defendant, was not a dying declara-
tion because Justice, who died forty-three days later, refused to go to the
hospital in the ambulance that had been summoned for him after his as-
sault. Approximately one hour after the ambulance left, another party
took Justice to the hospital. The court of appeals ruled that Justice's origi-
nal refusal to go to the hospital indicated that he was not conscious of
approaching death without hope of recovery. 29 The court held, however,
that Justice's statements were admissible as spontaneous exclamations, fre-
quently referred to as res gestae or excited utterances. 30
E. Vicarious Admissions
Several cases during the survey period followed Big Mac Trucking Co. v.
Dickerson ,3! which limited the category of agent or servant admissions
that are admissible against a principal. In Big Mac the Texas Supreme
Court held that the hearsay statements of an agent or employee should be
admitted against a principal as vicarious admissions only when the trial
judge finds, as a preliminary fact, that the statements were authorized. 32
Had the cases that followed Big Mac33 been tried after September 1, 1983,
the evidentiary holdings would have been different because Texas Rule of
Evidence 801 (e)(2)(d) reversed the much criticized Big Mac rule.34 Under
the new rule, admissions of agents or employees are admissible if they are
made during the existence of an employment relationship and concern
matters within the scope of the employment relationship, even though the
agent or servant has no authority to speak.35
27. Note that the dying declarations exception to the hearsay rule is contained in rule
804(b), which articulates those exceptions for which the declarant must be unavailable as a
witness. Id. 804(b).
28. 654 S.W.2d 478 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1983, writ ref d).
29. Id. at 481.
30. Id. The excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule is codified at TEX. R. EvID.
803(2). Note that while the dying declaration exception requires that the declarant be un-
available at time of trial, the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule is contained in
rule 803, which provides that the availability of the declarant is immaterial to the admissibil-
ity of the excited utterance. Id 803.
31. 497 S.W.2d 283 (Tex. 1973).
32. Id. at 287.
33. See, e.g., Green v. Texas Elec. Wholesalers, Inc., 651 S.W.2d 4, 7 (Tex. App.-
Houston [ist Dist.] 1982, no writ) (unauthorized statement of truck driver not admissible to
show employer's negligence); LaRoque v. Sanchez, 641 S.W.2d 298, 302 (Tex. App.-El
Paso 1982, writ refd n.r.e.) (unauthorized statements of employee that were not part of res
gestae of tort were inadmissible).




F Admissions of Party-Opponents
A distinction exists between two frequently confused exceptions to the
hearsay rule, the declarations against interest exception and the admissions
of parties exception.36 Admissions of party-opponents are admissible into
evidence without satisfying any of the requirements for declarations
against interest.37 Broadly stated, statements of a person that are inconsis-
tent with proprietary or pecuniary interests are considered to be declara-
tions against interest. 38 Admissions do not need to be against the interest
of the party when made, and the party making the admission need not be
unavailable. 39 The Texas Rules of Evidence, while treating statements
against interest as exceptions to the hearsay rule, treat admissions by a
party-opponent as statements that are not hearsay.40 During this survey
period, the Tyler court of appeals considered the hearsay exception for
admissions of party-opponents in Laviage v. Laviage.4' In refusing the
appellant's argument that two written memoranda of previous offers to
compromise were admissions of a party-opponent, the court determined
that offers of compromise are not admissible in evidence unless the com-
promise is completed.42
G. Judicial Admissions
A fact judicially admitted does not require evidence and establishes as a
matter of law the fact admitted, precluding a trial court from finding any
contrary facts.43 The Texas Rules of Evidence, while not specifically dis-
tinguishing judicial admissions from other admissions, treat admissions
not as exceptions to the hearsay rule but as statements that simply are not
hearsay."4 Judicial admissions can be made by either a party himself or by
someone authorized to make statements on his behalf,45 such as his
attorney.
An example of a judicial admission made by a party himself arose in
Cunningham v. Parkdale Bank.46 In Cunningham an independent admin-
istrator submitted an application to resign. In support of his application
36. TEX. R. EvID. 801(e)(2) defines admissions of party-opponents and id. 803(24) de-
fines statements against interest.
37. See generally IA R. RAY, supra note 21, § 1122, at 270-73 (distinction between ad-
missions and declarations against interest).
38. Id. § 1001, at 248.
39. Id. Note that TEX. R. EvID. 803(24), governing statements against interest, makes
the availability of the declarant immaterial to the admission of the statement against
interest.
40. Id. 801(e).
41. 647 S.W.2d 758 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1983, no writ).
42. Id. at 760.
43. IA R. RAY, supra note 21, § 1147, at 299-300. The Texas Supreme Court estab-
lished five requirements for judicial admissions in Griffin v. Superior Ins. Co., 161 Tex. 195,
201, 338 S.W.2d 415, 419 (1960). This opinion, as well as the strong dissent by four justices,
contains a comprehensive discussion of the nuances involved in judicial admissions.
44. See TEX. R. EvID. 801(e)(2).
45. Id.
46. 650 S.W.2d 484 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, no writ).
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the administrator filed a sworn final accounting in which he admitted
wrongful conversion of estate funds and prayed that the court audit, settle,
and approve the account. The Houston court of appeals held that the
statement in the accounting was a judicial admission and constituted suffi-
cient evidence for the court to enter judgment that the converted amounts
be returned to the estate.47
Four cases decided during this survey period held the pleading of cer-
tain facts to be judicial admissions. The Texas Supreme Court in Houston
First American Savings v. Musick 48 held that assertions of fact contained in
live pleadings and not pled in the alternative are regarded as formal judi-
cial admissions.49 The San Antonio court of appeals in Valdez v. Barrera5 °
held that admissions made by a party in abandoned pleadings may also be
introduced into evidence as admissions. 51
Similarly, admissions in the pleadings in a separate lawsuit were held
properly received into evidence as admissions in Whataburger, Inc. v.
Rutherford 52 Whataburger involved a suit by the prizewinner in a promo-
tional contest against the firm running the promotion arising from defects
in a vehicle that the plaintiff received as the prize. The defendant, in a
separate suit against the supplier of the vehicle, alleged that the vehicle
was unacceptable and unfit for use as an automobile. The Dallas court of
appeals held that the trial court properly received these allegations into
evidence as admissions, because in the separate suit against the supplier
the defendant in the instant suit had affirmatively claimed damages for
defects rather than merely demanding indemnity for the damages sought
by the present plaintiff.53 The distinction between affirmative relief and
indemnity also arose in Forest Lane Porsche-Audi, Inc. v. Staten ,4 where
the court held that pleadings alleging defective paintwork in a third-party
indemnity complaint by an automobile dealership against the party who
painted the plaintiff's automobile did not constitute admissions of that fact
in plaintiffs suit against the dealership arising from the purchase of an
automobile.55
47. Id at 487.
48. 650 S.W.2d 764 (Tex. 1983).
49. Id. at 769.
50. 647 S.W.2d 377 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, no writ).
51. Id. at 383. The court of appeals in Valdez wrote that admissions in abandoned
pleadings are admissible but not conclusive against the pleader. Id (citing Long v. Knox,
155 Tex. 581, 585, 291 S.W.2d 292, 293-94 (1956)). The court explained that admissions in
abandoned pleadings are evidence that the jury is entitled to consider, and the probative
value of the admission against interest is a question of fact for the jury. Although any ad-
mission in an abandoned pleading ceases to bind the pleader, such pleading still remains a
statement seriously made and can be introduced into evidence as an admission. 647 S.W.2d
at 382.
52. 642 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1982, no writ).
53. Id.
54. 638 S.W.2d 62 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1982, no writ).
55. Id. at 63.
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II. EXPERT OPINION EVIDENCE
A. Texas Rules of Evidence
Some of the most significant changes wrought by the Texas Rules of
Evidence are contained in article VII, governing opinions and expert testi-
mony. Article VII allows far more liberal admissions of experts' and lay
witnesses' opinions based on personal perceptions than did prior case law.
Lay witnesses may now state their opinions and no longer must state the
specific facts on which their opinions are based, as long as their opinions
are "helpful" and "rationally based" on perceptions. 56 Further, Texas
Rule of Evidence 704 provides that opinion testimony is not objectionable
because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the jury.57 In addi-
tion, the facts that form the bases for an expert's opinion may now be
outside the record if they are the type of hearsay reasonably relied upon by
experts in the same field. 58 This rule may nullify the limitation of Moore v.
Grantham59 that the testimony of an expert may not be based solely on
hearsay. Virtually all expert testimony is necessarily based at least in part
on hearsay, and Texas Rule of Evidence 703 seems to abolish the limita-
tion on how much hearsay an expert may consider in formulating his
opinions.
While rule 703 defines the substance of an expert's opinion, rule 705
defines the method for offering it. In this regard, rule 705 contains a very
important change from prior Texas practice. It is no longer necessary for
an expert witness to present his opinions through answers to hypothetical
questions. Rather, an expert may now state an opinion without stating its
foundation, leaving the other side to inquire as to the bases of the opin-
ion.60 The court, however, can still require the expert to state the data
underlying his opinion prior to admitting the opinion.61
B. Admissibility
If the trier of fact would be assisted in understanding evidence or deter-
mining a fact in issue by specialized knowledge, then "a witness qualified
as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. ' 62 An expert witness
may also draw inferences that a jury is not competent to draw from facts in
56. TEX. R. EvID. 701.
57. Id. 704.
58. Id. 703.
59. 599 S.W.2d 287, 289 (Tex. 1980).
60. TEX. R. EvID. 705.
61. Id. Another important change in examination of experts is contained in id 803(18),
the hearsay exception governing learned treatises. Learned treatises may now be proved by
one's own expert on direct examination, by other expert testimony, or by judicial notice. If
admitted, the statements may be read into evidence but may not be received as exhibits.
Prior Texas law allowed learned treatises to be used only to cross-examine an expert regard-
ing his opinion, not as substantive evidence. Prior case law also had required that the expert
being examined recognize the treatise as authoritative as a prerequisite to its use in cross-
examination. See Bowles v. Bourdon, 148 Tex. 1, 4, 219 S.W.2d 779, 783 (Tex. 1949).
62. TEX. R. EvID. 702.
[Vol. 38
EVIDENCE
evidence. 63 To justify the use of expert opinion testimony, however, the
subject of the inference or conclusion must be beyond the knowledge of
the typical layman. 64 The witness must also have sufficient skill, knowl-
edge, or experience within the particular field to demonstrate that he is
qualified to express an opinion.65
The trial court has tremendous discretion in determining the admissibil-
ity of expert opinion testimony, and an appeals court will not disturb a
trial court's decision to admit or exclude eypert testimony absent an abuse
of discretion.66 During this survey period; the San Antonio court of ap-
peals held in Storm Associates, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc. ,67 a suit seeking a deter-
mination of the parties' rights and interests in uranium, that a trial court
did not err in qualifying as an expert in the area of mining engineering a
full professor of mineral engineering at Columbia University. 68 The court
so held notwithstanding that the professor had no formal education in ge-
ology, hydrology, or mining engineering and was not a registered engineer
in Texas or any other state. Similarly, the Houston court of appeals held
that a trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the testimony of
the appellant's executive vice president as to the value of certain equip-
ment in a suit on a sworn account, where the witness had little or no exper-
tise in the area of the equipment and had depended upon other parties to
evaluate the equipment.69
C Effect of Opinion Testimony
Several appellate courts have recently considered the effect of expert
opinion testimony and whether either a court or jury is bound by the opin-
ion of an expert. In Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v. Midland Independent
School District70 the court held that a trial court was not required to accept
the value placed on a railroad's operating properties by the railroad's ex-
pert witness for purposes of assessment of taxes.7' Another appellate court
held in Tenngasco Gas Gathering Co. v. Bates72 that a jury may choose
among experts' opinion testimony on the question of value and set the
63. See 2 R. RAY, supra note 21, § 1400, at 23-27.
64. Id.
65. Id
66. See Wilson v. Scott, 412 S.W.2d 299, 303-04 (Tex. 1967) (testimony of retired doctor
with no special knowledge of stapedectomy excluded).
67. 645 S.W.2d 579 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1982, no writ).
68. Id at 586.
69. Alpine Geophysical Assoc., Inc. v. Quantum Elec. Corp., 651 S.W.2d 57, 60 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, no writ).
70. 647 S.W.2d 62 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1983, writ ref d n.r.e.).
71. Id at 65. The El Paso court concluded, in reversing and remanding the decision,
that a failure by the taxing authorities to use the cost approach and the income approach to
value, as approved by the Texas Supreme Court in Polk County v. Tenneco, Inc., 554
S.W.2d 918, 922-23 (Tex. 1977), and reiterated in Missouri-Kan.-Tex. R.R. v. City of Dallas,
623 S.W.2d 296, 299-300 (Tex. 1981), and the use instead of only a market approach, which
has been held to be of little use when there are no real comparable sales, resulted in an
arbitrary and erroneous method of appraising the land in question. 647 S.W.2d at 65.




value at any amount between the highest and the lowest values expressed
by the experts.73 Yet another appellate court held that where conflict is
present in expert testimony, a jury is not required to believe any expert
opinion.7 4
D. Testimony of Medical Experts
The trier of fact usually determines the issue of causation even when
expert testimony demonstrates probable cause. 75 Testimony that an event
is a possible cause of the condition is not evidence of reasonable medical
probability unless no other causal evidence is produced and the condition
more likely than not resulted from the event. 76 In reversing and remanding
instructed verdicts for the defendants in a medical malpractice case, the
Corpus Christi court of appeals held in Valdez v. Lyman-Roberts Hospital,
Inc. 77 that the plaintiffs had met their burden of proving that proper diag-
nosis and treatment could have been made at the time in question under
the same or similar circumstances, even in the absence of expert testimony
so stating.78 Lay testimony that no doctor was called to care for the dece-
dent, coupled with an expert's testimony that the decedent could have been
alive at the time of trial had she received proper care and treatment, was
sufficient evidence to overcome the defendant's motions for instructed ver-
dict.79 Continuing this trend toward judging medical testimony by its con-
tent rather than its form, the Texarkana court of appeals in Home
Insurance Co. v. Davis80 reversed and remanded a judgment in an occupa-
tional disease case against a workers' compensation carrier.8' The carrier's
medical expert had testified that the "most likely etiology" of the plaintiffs
chronic bronchitis was smoking. The court held that medical testimony is
not to be judged by semantics or by use of magic words, but by its
substance.82
Testimony by a medical expert in a medical malpractice case should
define the applicable standard of care for a specific condition and then
state what conduct of the defendant violated that standard of care.83 In
reversing and remanding a summary judgment granted in favor of the de-
73. Id at 498.
74. Thompson v. Mercantile Thrift Stores, Inc., 650 S.W.2d 120, 122 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, no writ). The court explained that testimony of expert witnesses
must be taken as true insofar as it establishes facts, but opinions as to deductions from those
facts are not binding on the trier of fact. Id
75. Lenger v. Physician's Gen. Hosp., Inc., 455 S.W.2d 703, 706 (Tex. 1970) (doctor
testified as to possible causes for separation of sutures of mesentery).
76. Id at 707.
77. 638 S.W.2d Ill (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1982, writ ref d n.r.e.). This case is
more fully discussed in Addison, Evidence, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 37 Sw. L.J. 265,
278-79 (1983).
78. 638 S.W.2d at 114-15.
79. Id.
80. 642 S.W.2d 268 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1982, no writ).
81. Id at 269.
82. Id
83. Snow v. Bond, 438 S.W.2d 549, 551 (Tex. 1969); Burks v. Meredith, 546 S.W.2d 366,
370 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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fendant doctor, the Fort Worth court of appeals held in Coan v. Winters,8 4
a medical malpractice case, that the testimony of a medical expert, who
stated in effect whether the defendant doctor was negligent in his care and
treatment of the plaintiff, was inadmissible and could not serve as the basis
for granting a summary judgment.85 Coan is a surprising case because the
court found the defendant's expert testimony inadequate to support the
summary judgment even though the plaintiff did not controvert it. The
court wrote that the expert testimony was not "clear, positive direct, other-
wise credible and free from contradictions and inconsistencies" as required
by Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166-A(c). 86 Further, because the plain-
tiffs hospital records were introduced into evidence, the evidence con-
tained certain contradictions and inconsistencies, as well as direct evidence
as to the probability of negligence on the part of the defendant.8 7
E Underlying Data
Rogers v. Gonzales88 is an interesting case because the reasoning of the
Corpus Christi court of appeals seems to follow the Texas Rules of Evi-
dence prior to their effective date and without reference to them. Rogers
involved the admission into evidence of the testimony of a highway patrol-
man who had investigated the traffic accident that was the basis of the suit.
The patrolman was allowed to testify as an expert witness after describing
his training and experience in accident investigation. The court of appeals
held that the patrolman's failure to detail what physical evidence he relied
upon in reaching his opinions did not negate the probative value of his
statement but instead merely affected the weight to be given his opinion.8 9
This approach parallels the practice now permitted by Texas Rule of Evi-
dence 705, but is a deviation from prior Texas practice. 90
F Lay Opinions
As noted above, the Texas Rules of Evidence greatly liberalize the ad-
mission of opinion testimony by lay witnesses.91 Texas case law has al-
ways been liberal, however, in allowing an owner of property to testify as
to his opinion of its value. The owner can give such testimony even
though he would not be qualified to testify as an expert to the value of the
same property if another person owned it.92 One appellate court during the
survey period allowed testimony by the owner of a vehicle that his car was
84. 646 S.W.2d 655 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
85. Id at 657-58.
86. Id.; see TEX. R. Civ. P. 166-A(c).
87. 646 S.W.2d at 659.
88. 654 S.W.2d 509 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1983, no writ).
89. Id. at 513-14.
90. See Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Everett, 275 S.W.2d 713, 716 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1955, writ refd n.r.e.) (hypothetical presentation required when doctor could not supply
facts upon which he based his expert inference).
91. TEX. R. EvID. 701; see supra text accompanying note 56.
92. Classified Parking Sys. v. Kirby, 507 S.W.2d 586, 588 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1974, no writ) (owner of car stolen from parking garage was competent to testify
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worth "around $3,000.00." 9 3 The court explained that the rules pertaining
to establishing value should be liberally construed when the owner of the
property is the witness testifying as to its value.94
Guidance in interpreting the new liberal admission of lay testimony
under Texas Rule of Evidence 701 is available in a recent federal case. In
Soden v. Freightliner Corp. 95 the testimony at issue was that of a truck
service manager in charge of daily maintenance of sixty trucks primarily
belonging to the defendant manufacturer. The suit involved a products
liability claim based upon the post-collision fuel ignition fire of a truck.
The plaintiff did not offer the truck service manager as an expert witness,
but the service manager testified that in the normal course of performing
his duties, he had observed holes or cuts in the truck's fuel tanks near the
location of the pointed step brackets. This observation was the basis for
his opinion that the brackets were the cause of the holes and that the situa-
tion was dangerous and would have been apparent to a normal person in
his position. In affirming the admissibility of this lay testimony, the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals articulated the three elements that must be pres-
ent before lay opinion evidence is admissible under Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 701, of which Texas Rule of Evidence 701 is a verbatim copy. The
Fifth Circuit explained that, first, the witness must have personal knowl-
edge of the facts from which his opinion is derived; second, a rational con-
nection must exist between the opinion of the lay witness and the facts on
which it is based; and third, the opinion must be helpful in understanding
the testimony or in determining a fact issue.96 The court further stated
that under certain circumstances a layman may express an opinion even on
matters appropriate for expert testimony if these enumerated requirements
are satisfied.97 An opinion is not necessarily inadmissible when it goes to
an ultimate fact under Federal Rule of Evidence 70198 and, as noted ear-
lier, Texas Rule of Evidence 704 provides that opinion or inference testi-
mony is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue of fact.99
The Houston court of appeals considered whether the testimony of a lay
witness embraced a legal conclusion in Shell Oil Co. v. Waxier. I ° Wax/er
involved a suit by an independent contractor's employee against an oil
company to recover for personal injuries sustained while working on the
oil company's premises. The trial court rendered judgment on a jury ver-
dict for the employee, and the oil company appealed. Appellant Shell
complained of the trial court's admission into evidence of the testimony of
to car's value); Barstow v. Jackson, 429 S.W.2d 536, 538 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1968, no writ) (owner of car damaged in collision could testify to reduced market value) .
93. First Nat'l Bank v. Brown, 644 S.W.2d 808, 811 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1982,
writ refd n.r.e.).
94. Id.
95. 714 F.2d 498 (5th Cir. 1983).
96. Id. at 511.
97. Id
98. FED. R. EVID. 701.
99. See supra text accompanying note 57.
100. 652 S.W.2d 454 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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certain lay witnesses regarding the legal duties and obligations of Shell
and its independent contractor, Brown & Root, the plaintiffs employer.
Shell contended in particular that its safety representative contractor, Mr.
Hruska, was questioned extensively regarding his duties and was asked
whether Shell had an obligation to provide the plaintiff with a safe place to
work. Shell also argued that a Brown & Root engineer, Mr. Harris, was
improperly asked what Shell could have required Brown & Root to do
about rectifying a dangerous condition maintained by the independent
contractor on Shell's property. Shell argued on appeal that a witness may
not testify to a legal conclusion'0 1 and that the existence of a legal duty is a
matter of law.' 02 The Wax/er court reasoned that although some of the
questions to Hruska tended to call for legal conclusions, the answers he
gave did not pertain so much to Shell's contractual relationship with
Brown & Root as to the witness' perception of his own job responsibilities
as safety representative contractor. 03 The court further found that Har-
ris's testimony did not constitute a legal conclusion because he testified
only with respect to the action Shell would have taken in the event it had
discovered a safety violation by one of its independent contractors.1°4
III. PAROL EVIDENCE
The parol evidence rule proscribes the use of extrinsic evidence to inter-
pret a writing. The court may allow extrinsic evidence only if it finds a
contract to be ambiguous. 0 5 The rule also prohibits parol evidence if a
writing is integrated. 06
During this survey period, several appellate courts rejected attempts to
introduce parol evidence on varied and ingenious grounds. One court held
parol evidence inadmissible to vary the unambiguous terms of a written
contract signed by a party acting as an agent, where the contract gave no
indication that an agency existed or that the party who signed it acted
other than as a principal. 0 7 The court so held even though the other con-
tracting party knew the identity of the principal and the parties to the con-
tract intended that the agent not be personally bound.108 Parol evidence
was also held inadmissible to show an oral condition precedent to a written
contract.109 Such evidence must be excluded because of the well-estab-
101. Appellant relied on Carr v. Radkey, 393 S.W.2d 806, 810 (Tex. 1965), and Lindley
v. Lindley, 384 S.W.2d 676, 682 (Tex. 1964) (both holding testimony regarding legal capacity
of testator to execute will was inadmissible).
102. See Abalos v. Oil Dev. Co., 544 S.W.2d 627, 631 (Tex. 1976).
103. 652 S.W.2d at 459.
104. Id.
105. See Sun Oil Co. v. Madeley, 626 S.W.2d 726, 732 (Tex. 1981) (construction of un-
ambiguous oil and gas lease).
106. Integration is the practice of embodying a transaction in a final written agreement
that is intended to incorporate in its terms the entire transaction. See 2 R. RAY, supra note
21, § 1602, at 312-14.
107. Martin v. Xarin Real Estate, Inc., 703 F.2d 883, 891 (5th Cir. 1983).
108. Id.
109. Pan Am. Bank v. Nowland, 650 S.W.2d 879, 884 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, no
writ) (parol evidence relating to collateral pledge agreement inadmissible).
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lished rule that a contemporaneous oral agreement is not admissible where
it contravenes the terms of an unambiguous written instrument."I0
A third court held parol evidence inadmissible to explain an agreement
between two defendants and the plaintiff to the effect that defendants
would pay plaintiff $50,000 if the plaintiff failed to recover at least that
much from third-party defendants."' The court found the agreement to
be complete and unambiguous on its face, so that parol evidence could not
be used to explain its terms." 12 Nor was parol evidence from an insurance
company's employee in another case allowed to contradict what the court
found to be the clearly stated intentions of the parties as shown in an in-
surance contract." 3 One court observed that when the trial court errone-
ously admits parol evidence into evidence, that evidence may not be
considered on appeal because the parol evidence rule is a rule of substan-
tive law.' ' 4 By contrast, the court in Scholz v. HeathI " held parol evi-
dence admissible to explain an ambiguity in a deed." 6 The court in
Stanley v. Conner Construction Co. "7 held parol evidence admissible to
show that a corporation was the true borrower in a loan contract and that
its president intended merely to guarantee corporate indebtedness." 18
IV. JUDICIAL NOTICE
Judicial notice is now governed by article II of the Texas Rules of Evi-
dence. Texas Rule of Evidence 201, governing judicial notice of adjudica-
tive facts, is a verbatim adoption of Federal Rule of Evidence 201 and
basically does not alter existing Texas practice. Texas Rule of Evidence
201 defines the facts of which judicial notice properly may be taken.' ' 9
110. Id (citing Lewis v. East Tex. Fin. Co., 136 Tex. 149, 150, 146 S.W.2d 977, 980
(1941); McPherson v. Johnson, 436 S.W.2d 930, 932 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1968, writ
ref'd n.r.e.)).
111. General Motors Corp. v. Grizzle, 642 S.W.2d 837, 842 (Tex. App.-Waco 1982, writ
dism'd).
112. Id.
113. Entzminger v. Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 652 S.W.2d 533, 536 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, no writ).
114. Incorporated Carriers, Ltd. v. Crocker, 639 S.W.2d 338, 341 (Tex. App.-Texarkana
1982, no writ).
115. 642 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. App.-Waco 1982, no writ). This case involved an attempt to
convey half of an entire mineral estate, but the deed excepted a prior one-half royalty inter-
est while simultaneously reserving a one-half mineral estate. The court found that ambigu-
ity arose as to whether the grantor or the grantee received the one-half royalty interest. Id.
at 557.
116. Id
117. 651 S.W.2d 34 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1983, no writ). The appellant contended that
the letter agreement and real estate lien note in question were unambiguous, that parol
evidence was inadmissible to vary their effect, and that plaintiff Stanley had signed the note
in his individual capacity as a borrower. The El Paso court of appeals, in affirming the
admission of the parol evidence, relied on TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.415(c) (Tex.
UCC) (Vernon 1968), which provides: "As against a holder in due course and without no-
tice of the accommodation oral proof of the accommodation is not admissible to give the
accommodation party the benefit of discharges dependent on his character as such. In other
cases the accommodation character may be shown by oral proof." 651 S.W.2d at 37.
118. 651 S.W.2d at 38-39.
119. TEX. R. EvID. 201.
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The rule also prescribes when the taking of judicial notice is discretionary
or mandatory, the time of taking notice, and the instructions to the jury. 120
Other rules in article II govern the determination of the laws of other
states ' 2' and of foreign countries. 22
During this survey period, the appellate courts of Texas affirmed the
taking of judicial notice of such varied subjects as that four ounces of ma-
rijuana is a usable amount 123 and, in a proceeding contesting an appel-
lant's affidavit of inability to pay costs on appeal, the testimony of two
doctors that the claimant was able to work at several types of jobs. 124 The
Tyler court of appeals took judicial notice on appeal of certain mechanics'
and materialmen's lien statutes for purposes of establishing that the act of
one partner in signing a general indemnity agreement was in fact an act for
carrying on the business of the partnership within the meaning of the
Texas Uniform Partnership Act. 125
V. IMPEACHMENT
Several of the Texas Rules of Evidence specifically govern impeachment
of witnesses. 126 During this survey period the Corpus Christi court of ap-
peals in Houston Lighting & Power Co. v. Sue 12 7 reaffirmed the rule that
impeachment evidence on collateral matters that affects the credibility of a
witness or party is clearly admissible. 128 Reasoning that the rule of admis-
sibility of impeachment evidence should be liberal and that the trial court
should have the discretion to receive any evidence that promises to expose
falsehood, 129 the court affirmed the admission into evidence of a settle-
ment agreement that tended to impeach the testimony of the defendant's
representative, who had testified that he had no authority to settle any
problem with the plaintiff lessee in this suit involving trespass on grazing
lands. 130
VI. PRIVILEGES
Article V of the Texas Rules of Evidence governs privileges. The article




123. Siroky v. State, 653 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e).
124. Keller v. Walker, 652 S.W.2d 542, 544 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, no writ).
125. Durkin v. American Gen. Fire & Casualty Co., 651 S.W.2d 41, 45 (Tex. App.-
Tyler 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.), (citing TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 5452, 6132(b), § 9(1)
(Vernon 1958 & Supp. 1984)).
126. See TEX. R. EvID. 607 (who may impeach); id. 608 (evidence of character and con-
duct of witness); id 609 (impeach by evidence of conviction of crime).
127. 644 S.W.2d 835 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1982, writ refd n.r.e.).
128. Id at 842; see also Royal v. Cameron, 382 S.W.2d 335, 342 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler
1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (insurance policy provisions used to impeach appellant's testimony
that she could not afford to see doctor at earlier date).
129. 644 S.W.2d at 842; see also 1 R. RAY, supra note 21, § 685, at 622 (list of types of
evidence that should be admissible).
130. 644 S.W.2d at 842.
1984]
SO UTH WESTERN LAW JO URNAL
the rules. The rules provide for a lawyer-client privilege,' 3' a husband-
wife communications privilege, 32 a privilege for communications to cler-
gymen, 33 a privilege for political votes,' 34 a privilege for trade secrets, 35 a
privilege for the identity of informers, 136 a physician-patient privilege,' 37
and confidentiality for mental health information. 38 The rules also pro-
vide that privileges are waived by voluntary disclosure 39 and that disclo-
sure of privileged matters under compulsion or without opportunity to
claim a privilege does not defeat the claim of privilege.' 40 The Texas
Rules of Evidence have eliminated the statutory accountant-client privi-
lege. 14 Contrary to prior Texas practice, the rules abolish the eavesdrop-
per exception to the lawyer-client privilege and the husband-wife
communication privilege. 42
During this survey period two Texas courts considered the parameters of
the attorney-client privilege. Mortgage American Corp. v. American Na-
tional Bank1 indicates that mere delivery of a pre-existing document to
an attorney does not invoke the attorney-client privilege for the document.
Mortgage American involved a memorandum that had been drafted by a
mortgage company president regarding the disputed sale of government
national mortgage association certificates. The memorandum had been
drafted before the company retained counsel and not for purposes of ob-
taining counsel or legal advice. The court properly held that the memo-
randum was not subject to the attorney-client privilege and was thus
admissible in the bank's breach of contract action against the mortgage
company. '44
In response to an interesting but unsuccessful attempt to invoke the at-
torney-client privilege, the San Antonio court of appeals in Lopez v.
State 45 held that the privilege did not preclude an attorney who had rep-










141. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 41a-l, § 26 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983) was re-
pealed in conjunction with the enactment of the Texas Rules of Evidence, and the rules do
not provide for an accountant-client privilege to replace it. Such privilege still exists, how-
ever, in the context of the attorney-client privilege or as work-product. TEX. R. EVID.
503(a)(4) has expanded the attorney-client privilege by including in the definition of "repre-
sentative of the lawyer" "an accountant who is reasonably necessary for the lawyer's rendi-
tion of the professional legal services."
142. TEX. R. EvID. 504, the husband-wife communication privilege, codifies practice pre-
viously governed by TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 3715 (Vernon 1926), which has been
repealed. Both this rule and rule 503, governing the lawyer-client privilege, omit the eaves-
dropper from the list of exclusive exceptions to these privileges. See TEX. R. EvID. 503, 504.
143. 651 S.W.2d 851 (Tex. App.-Austin 1983, writ ref d n.r.e.).
144. Id. at 858.
145. 651 S.W.2d 830 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, pet. ref'd).
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resented the defendant in a previous, unrelated matter from testifying that
the defendant was present at the scene of the crime.' 46 The attorney testi-
fied as to the defendant's presence at the scene without disclosing the prior
attorney-client relationship. Appellant contended that the witness could
identify him only because of the attorney-client relationship. The court




A. Rule of Optional Completeness
When a party introduces only a portion of a writing or recorded state-
ment, Texas Rule of Evidence 106 allows the adverse party to introduce
any other part of it contemporaneously with the introduction of the incom-
plete portion. 148 Rule 106 allows admission of other portions of the docu-
ment "which ought in fairness to be considered" with the incomplete
portions introduced. 149 At times, however, a complete document will not
be admissible even under rule 106. A pre-Texas Rules of Evidence case
decided during this survey period, Brown v. Gonzales, 150 exemplifies such a
situation without reference to rule 106. The plaintiff in Brown was struck
by a boat owned by his stepfather and driven by the defendant. The court
of appeals held that the trial court did not err in excluding from evidence
the settlement agreement between the plaintiff and the parties responsible
for the boat's manufacture and sale, even though the defendant had been
permitted to edit the agreements and offer those portions that were
favorable to him.' 5' The court reasoned that the portions that the trial
court excluded were hearsay, were prejudicial, and purported to resolve
issues of liability and damages that were clearly within the province of the
jury. 152
B. Exclusion of Relevant Evidence on Special Grounds
Texas Rule of Evidence 403 provides that, "[a]lthough relevant, evi-
dence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading
the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence."' 53 Rule 403 is a verbatim adoption of Federal Rule
of Evidence 403, and a recent decision by the United States Court of Ap-
146. Id. at 838.
147. Id.
148. TEX. R. EVID. 106. One who for strategic reasons prefers to wait until cross-exami-
nation to introduce other parts of the document may still do so, however, as this rule is not
intended to circumscribe the right of cross-examination. See TEX. R. EvID. 106 comment.
149. Id. 106.
150. 653 S.W.2d 854 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, no writ).
151. Id. at 863-64.
152. Id.
153. TEX. R. EVID. 403. This list omits an important ground for exclusion of relevant
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peals for the Fifth Circuit, Jon-T Chemicals, Inc. v. Freeport Chemical
Co. ,154 demonstrates the rule's operation. In this action for a seller's al-
leged breach of a sales agreement, the buyer complained on appeal that
the district court erred when it failed to admit a transcript of a taped tele-
phone conversation between officials of the plaintiff and the defendant.
The appellant buyer argued that the transcript would have demonstrated
that the defendant agreed to deliver the product in question despite ad-
verse weather conditions. In excluding the transcript, the district court ob-
served that portions of the transcript related to issues upon which it had
previously granted summary judgment, that deposition testimony already
in evidence adequately covered the material in the transcript, that the de-
fendant would be unduly prejudiced by its admission, and that under the
court's managerial duty to achieve a just result the transcript should not be
admitted. 55 The Fifth Circuit, reasoning that the probative value of the
transcript was thus outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice and con-
fusion of the issues, affirmed the exclusion of the transcript. 56
VIII. LACK OF PROBATIVE EVIDENCE AND INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE
Many appellate cases each year address the issue of whether any evi-
dence or sufficient evidence in the record supports the determinations of
the trier of fact.157 The Texas Supreme Court recently confronted this is-
sue in Kindred v. Con/Chem, Inc. 158 Kindred was a suit against a paint
primer manufacturer by individuals injured when the primer ignited. The
plaintiffs claimed they had sustained personal injuries from the use of the
product and alleged that the product was defective. The plaintiffs also as-
serted that the defendant had failed to warn adequately of the dangers in
using the product and that the product's design was unreasonably danger-
ous. The trial court refused to submit an issue on design defect and sub-
mitted only the issue of marketing defect. The trial court entered a take-
nothing judgment based on the jury verdict, and the court of appeals af-
firmed.159 The supreme court, in reversing and remanding, held that the
evidence, which included the testimony of an environmental chemist relat-
ing to feasibility of a safer alternative to ingredients in defendant's primer,
was sufficient to submit the issue of design defect to the jury. 160 The court
explained that the no-evidence rule provides that, if reasonable minds can-
not differ from the conclusion that the evidence offered to support the
existence of a vital fact lacks probative force, the evidence offered is the
evidence previously recognized in Texas, unfair surprise to an opponent. Presumably, a
court will have to rectify unfair surprise by either recess or continuance.
154. 704 F.2d 1412 (5th Cir. 1983).
155. 1d. at 1417-18.
156. Id.
157. For an excellent discussion of this general area of the law, see Calvert, "No Evi-
dence" and "Insufficient Evidence" Points of Error, 38 TEX. L. REV. 361 (1960).
158. 650 S.W.2d 61 (Tex. 1983).
159. 644 S.W.2d 828 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1982).
160. 650 S.W.2d at 63.
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legal equivalent of no evidence. 16  In the instant case, however, the
supreme court held that some evidence, which was more than a scintilla,
supported the allegations of defective design because it furnished a reason-
able basis for differing conclusions concerning the existence of a design
defect in the primer.162 Accordingly, the trial court should have submitted
special issues on the design defect. 63
In deciding a no-evidence point, an appellate court must consider only
the evidence and inferences tending to support the trial court's findings
and disregard all contrary evidence and inferences.164 The Corpus Christi
court of appeals' reversal on a no-evidence point in HE. Butt Grocery Co.
v. Snodgrass'65 demonstrates the operation of this standard of review.
Snodgrass involved the appeal of a business owner from a trial court order
overruling his plea of privilege in a personal injury case. The court of
appeals held that the patron of the business wholly failed to establish by
probative evidence any of the specific acts of negligence alleged in her pe-
tition, and thus it was error to overrule the business owner's plea of privi-
lege.' 66 The court, giving the appellee's testimony the weight to which it
was entitled and indulging every reasonable inference in favor of its suffi-
ciency, held that the appellee succeeded only in establishing that she pick-
ed up a carton of soft drinks in appellant's place of business and that a
bottle fell through the wet bottom of the carton, causing her injury.1 67 The
court wrote that a thorough search of the record revealed no evidence that
tended to prove who placed the wet carton in the store, how long it had
been there, how the carton became wet, or any knowledge of appellant or
its agents that the carton was wet. 168 Because the mere happening of an
accident does not in itself ordinarily evidence negligence,' 69 the court held
that the plaintiff had failed to establish any specific act of negligence and,
accordingly, reversed the decision of the trial court and granted defend-
ant's plea of privilege.' 70
If a party to a lawsuit introduces written evidence without limiting its
purpose,' 7 ' he is bound by the facts recited in that evidence.' 72 The appel-
lant in Western Construction Co. v. Valero Transmission Co. '73 confronted
precisely this problem. In Western a pipeline owner sued a construction




164. Garza v. Alviar, 395 S.W.2d 821, 823 (Tex. 1965).
165. 655 S.W.2d 241 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1983, no writ).
166. Id. at 243.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Thoreson v. Thompson, 431 S.W.2d 341, 344 (Tex. 1968) (any activity involves
some risk of harm).
170. 655 S.W.2d at 243.
171. See TEX. R. EVID. 105; supra note 9.
172. Green v. State, 589 S.W.2d 160, 162 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979, no writ); Hidalgo
County v. Pate, 443 S.W.2d 80, 88 (Tex. Civ. App-Corpus Christi 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
173. 655 S.W.2d 251 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1983, no writ).
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construction company's employee struck and ruptured the pipeline. The
trial court entered judgment in favor of the pipeline owner and both par-
ties appealed. The court of appeals held that the admitted evidence per-
mitted a finding that the value of the gas loss to the pipeline owner as a
result of the rupture was $2.08 per thousand cubic feet. The defendant
construction company had introduced at trial an invoice showing the price
of the gas as $2.08 per thousand cubic feet. Although the defendant had
not introduced the invoice on the question of the gas price, it failed to limit
the purposes for which it did introduce the invoice. Accordingly, the con-
struction company was bound by the facts recited therein, which the court
found sufficient to support the damages assessed by the trier of fact. 174
Two courts during the survey period reaffirmed the proposition that evi-
dence is not required to support a negative answer to a jury issue. 175 One
court explained that it is improper to treat negative fact findings as more
than the failure of the trier of fact to find such issues. 176 Negative findings
mean, in law, that a plaintiff simply failed to meet its burden of proof.
The San Antonio court of appeals reversed two cases presenting interest-
ing questions of sufficiency of the evidence. In Garcia v. Universal Gas
Corp. 177 the plaintiff sued for property damages arising out of a gas explo-
sion and fire that destroyed her house. The trial court entered judgment
for the defendant gas company based on the jury verdict. On appeal, the
court held that evidence that the gas company was notified of a gas odor at
the house but did not inform its repairman of the odor, that the company
sent its repairman to open the valve and light the pilot lights, and that an
explosion occurred thereafter was clearly insufficient to support the jury's
findings that the gas company was not notified of the gas leak. 178 The
same evidence was also insufficient to support the jury's finding that turn-
ing on the gas and lighting the pilot lights was not negligent. 179
In In re E. G.M. 180 the San Antonio court of appeals reversed and re-
manded a trial court's finding of nonpaternity as being so against the great
weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust or
clearly wrong.18 ' In E.G.M. the alleged father of a minor child denied
paternity, arguing on appeal that the child's mother was not worthy of
belief. The court noted that the defendant's exclusive access to the mother
during the relevant period and medical testimony indicating a 98.9% likeli-
hood of paternity were virtually undisputed. 8 2 The appellate court held
174. Id at 253-54.
175. Offer v. TransAmerica Title Ins. Co., 653 S.W.2d 373, 374 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1983, no writ); Ryan Mortgage Investors v. Flemming-Wood, 650 S.W.2d 928, 934 (Tex.
App.- Fort Worth 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
176. Offer v. TransAmerica Title Ins. Co., 653 S.W.2d 373, 375 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1983, no writ).
177. 653 S.W.2d 362 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
178. Id at 364.
179. Id
180. 647 S.W.2d 74 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, no writ).
181. Id at 79.
182. Id at 78.
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that the trial court's finding of nonpaternity was therefore against the great
weight and preponderance of the evidence.' 83 The court wrote that al-
though the fact finder has the role of judge of the credibility of witnesses,
evidence of such a high probability of paternity can amount to strong cor-
roboration of a witness's story on the material issues and, when considered
together with proper undisputed facts, can preponderate in favor of a find-
ing of paternity. 84
IX. PRESUMPTIONS AND INFERENCES
Article III of the Federal Rules of Evidence governs presumptions. Be-
cause the Texas Rules of Evidence contain no article III, presumptions
continue to be governed by established Texas common law.
Presumptions and inferences, though frequently confused, are some-
times merely assumptions of facts that have not been rebutted. 185 During
the survey period the Texas Supreme Court considered presumptions and
inferences in Walters v. American States Insurance Co. ,186 a case involving
a workers' compensation claim for death benefits. The plaintiff alleged
that the decedent had been killed in the course and scope of his employ-
ment. The evidence showed that the deceased employee, Mr. Justice, was
his employer Mr. Lamport's righthand man. It was usual practice for Jus-
tice to accompany Lamport for discussion of interior design plans with
prospective customers. The day before their deaths, Lamport told Justice
to meet with him to discuss the next day's business meeting at an airport
hotel. They left town together the following day to meet with a customer
and later were found shot to death in the vicinity of the airport. But for
Lamport's directions to Justice to accompany him, Justice would not have
left town with Lamport. The supreme court, reversing and remanding the
decision of the court of appeals, 8 7 held that sufficient evidence supported
a jury finding that the plaintiffs decedent received his fatal injuries in the
course of his employment. 88 The supreme court, citing Farley v. M M
Cattle Co. ,189 stated that the court first looks to the rules regarding infer-
ences, and when the court can draw reasonable inferences from the evi-
dence presumptions are unnecessary. 190 Relying on Farley, the supreme
court stated that a number of inferences may be drawn from a single fact
situation. The court explained that the simple question before it and the
jury in Walters was "a question of logic-whether the jury, upon the basis
of the facts proved, made a reasonable inferential leap or whether their
183. Id.
184. Id at 78-79.
185. See generaly I R. RAY, supra note 21, §§ 51-56 (classification of presumptions).
186. 654 S.W.2d 423 (Tex. 1983); see supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text (more
complete discussion of case).
187. 636 S.W.2d 794 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1982). The Tyler court of appeals had reversed
the trial court's entry of judgment favorable to the claimant.
188. 654 S.W.2d at 426-27.
189. 529 S.W.2d 751, 757 (Tex. 1975).
190. 654 S.W.2d at 426.
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logical leap was too far."' 191 The court concluded that the facts, as reason-
ably and logically proven, supported the jury finding. 192
The Texas Supreme Court considered the effect of presumptions, as dis-
tinguished from inferences, during this survey period in Houston First
American Savings v. Musick . 93 At the trial of this trespass to try title suit,
the savings and loan association that claimed title superior to that of the
individual defendant introduced a deed by which the substitute trustee had
conveyed the property to a third party. The deed recited compliance with
all conditions of the deed of trust. The savings and loan association ar-
gued that the recital in the substitute trustee's deed established that the
foreclosure sale, at which a third party acquired the property and upon
which the association's claim of title depended, conformed to the condi-
tions set out in the deed of trust. The supreme court, while agreeing that
the recital in the deed was prima facie evidence that the terms of the trust
were fulfilled, noted that recitals in a trustee's deed give rise only to a
presumption of validity and relate only to matters in evidence. 194 The
court pointed to precedent that established that the presumption of the
validity of the sale is not conclusive and may be rebutted. 95 The court
held evidence presented at trial showed that although the individual de-
fendant admitted that the third party purchased the note and deed of trust
at the foreclosure sale and thereby conceded the third party's authority to
appoint a substitute trustee, the individual defendant nevertheless rebutted
the presumption that the substitute trustee complied with the conditions
contained in the deed of trust. 196
In a recent case the supreme court also discussed and defined when evi-
dence is established conclusively. In Triton Oil & Gas Corp. v. Marine Con-
tractors & Supply, Inc. 197 the defendant filed a counterclaim for usury.
The trial court overruled the defendant's motion to include usury penalties
in its judgment against the plaintiff. The Corpus Christi court of appeals
reversed that part of the judgment overruling the defendant's motion and
rendered judgment in favor of the defendant for twice the amount of the
usurious interest. The supreme court held that the defendant had made
out a prima facie case of usury against the plaintiff and that the evidence
was insufficient to overcome that prima facie case. 198  The evidence
showed that Triton had unilaterally charged interest on Marine's invoices
and deducted those charges from Marine's share of the proceeds. The
191. Id
192. Id.
193. 650 S.W.2d 764 (Tex. 1983). This case is also notable for its extensive discussion of
judicial admissions by assertions of fact in live pleadings. See supra notes 43-55 and accom-
panying text.
194. Id. at 767 (citing Slaughter v. Quails, 139 Tex. 340, 347, 162 S.W.2d 671, 676
(1942)).
195. 650 S.W.2d at 767 (citing Hart v. Eason, 159 Tex. 375, 376, 321 S.W.2d 574, 575
(1959)).
196. 650 S.W.2d at 767-68.
197. 644 S.W.2d 443 (Tex. 1982).
198. Id at 445-46.
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supreme court wrote that this evidence did not establish an agreement be-
tween the parties to interest charges of ten percent. 199 Further, no evi-
dence disclosed any conduct by Marine indicating its acceptance of the ten
percent interest charges. Although Marine never complained of the inter-
est charges, it also never paid them. The supreme court held that Triton's
act of deducting the charges from Marine's share of the proceeds did not
constitute payment of the charges, particularly because Marine never re-
ceived any of the proceeds.2°° Since an issue is conclusively established
when the evidence is such that no room exists for ordinary minds to differ
as to the conclusion to be drawn from it,201 the supreme court held that
this evidence did not overcome Marine's prima facie case or raise a fact
question as to the existence or non-existence of an agreement. 20 2 The
court held that because the evidence conclusively established the absence
of an agreement, no question of waiver under rule 279 was presented.203
Another case during this survey period considered when testimony es-
tablishes facts as a matter of law. Sandoval v. Hartford Casualty Insurance
Co. 204 involved an insured's action to recover from a casualty insurer for
damages sustained in the upset of his truck. The trial court rendered a
take-nothing judgment and the insured appealed. In reversing and render-
ing, the Amarillo court of appeals held that the positive, uncontradicted
testimony of a witness may not be arbitrarily disregarded, particularly
when the testimony is so clear that it is unnecessary to speculate on the
witness's veracity. 20 5 "[W]here the testimony of a witness, even an inter-
ested one, is clear, direct, positive, and uncontradicted by any other wit-
ness or attendant circumstances, it is taken as true as a matter of law." 20 6
The insurance company had defended the suit on the ground that damage
to plaintiff's truck was due solely to mechanical breakdown or failure,
which was excluded from coverage. The Sandoval court found that the
testimony of two witnesses, including the plaintiff, that the load shifted met
the criteria for being accepted as true as a matter of law. Accordingly, by
such evidence plaintiff met his burden to negate the pleaded exclusion. 20 7
199. Id. at 446.
200. Id
201. Id. (citing Joske v. Irvine, 91 Tex. 574, 581, 44 S.W.2d 1059, 1063 (1898); 3 R. Mc-
DONALD, TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE IN DISTRICT AND COUNTY COURTS § 12.08, at 294 (F.
Elliot rev. ed. 1970)).
202. 644 S.W.2d at 446.
203. Id (citing TEX. R. Civ. P. 279).
204. 653 S.W.2d 604 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1983, no writ).
205. Id. at 607.
206. Id.
207. Id.
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